Religious Slaughter and Animal Welfare Revisited: CJEU, Liga van Moskeeen en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen (2018) by Peters, Anne
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Religious Slaughter and Animal Welfare Revisited: CJEU, Liga van 
Moskeeen en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen 
(2018) 
Anne Peters 
University of Michigan Law School, anneps@umich.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2308 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles 
 Part of the Animal Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law 
Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peters, Anne. "Religious Slaughter and Animal Welfare Revisited: CJEU, Liga van Moskeeen en 
Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen (2018)." Can. J. Comp. & Contemp. L. 5, no. 1 (2019): 
269-97. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Religious Slaughter and Animal
Welfare Revisited: CJEU, Liga van
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Provincie Antwerpen (2018)
Anne Peters*
The article comments on a Grand Chamberjudgment by the Court of the European
Union on animal slaughter according to Islamic prescriptions. The relevant European
Union laws prescribe that religious slaughter without stunning of the animal may only
takeplace in approved slaughterhouses. This causes a shortage during the Muslim Feast of
Sacrifice in the Belgian province ofAntwerp. The EU law provisions are in conformity
with the animal welfare mainstreaming clause of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union. Moreover, the EU regulation and its application in the concrete
case does not violate the fundamental right offree exercise of religion as guaranteed by
the EU Fundamental Rights Charter. Finally, the refusal to make an exception for
the peak demandfor slaughter facilities during the Feast of Sacrfice does not constitute
an indirect discrimination against Muslims. The paper agrees with the outcome of the
judgment but criticises the Courtforfailing to consider the rights of religious minorities
more broadly, andfor not addressing the animal welfarepoint sufficiently.
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I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUND, PROCEEDINGS, AND FACTS ON SLAUGHTER
III. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU REGULATION WITH ARTICLE i13 TFEU
IV. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU REGULATION WITH THE FREEDOM
OF RELIGION
A. No actual restriction of the fundamental right by the rule "as such"
B. Strict application of the provisions during the Feast of Sacrifice in
Muslim populated areas
V. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION OF A RELIGIOUS GROUP THROUGH
STRICT APPLICATION OF THE REGULATION?
A. The test for indirect discrimination
B. The prohibition of home slaughter as a suitable and necessary measure
to further animal welfare as a legitimate objective in the public interest
C. Relevant case law of the ECtHR




T he tension between respect for religious and cultural practices on the
one side and animal welfare on the other is particularly acute when
it comes to slaughter. From a legal perspective, this tension translates into
a juridic conflict between the fundamental rights of religious believers on
the one hand and the legally recognised objective of animal protection on
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the other.1 The prevailing view - shared by this contribution - is that
the conventional modern slaughter with prior or simultaneous stunning
and killing, as routinely practiced in Europe, is better for the animals
than un-stunned killing as practiced by various religious groups, notably
Muslim and Jewish communities (see in detail on this point below Part
II). The question then arises to what extent religious demands should
nevertheless be satisfied - at the expense of animal welfare.
This question was recently examined by the Court of Justice of
the European Union ("CJEU"). In Liga van Moskee~n en islamitische
Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZW v Vlaams Gewest,2 the CJEU
(Grand Chamber) found to be valid an EU law prescribing that religious
slaughter without stunning of the animal may only take place in approved
slaughterhouses. According to the Court, the relevant provisions do not
violate primary law, notably neither the freedom of religion as guaranteed
in Article 10 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights ("EUCFR")
nor the animal welfare mainstreaming clause of Article 13 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (" TFEU").>
This article first contextualises the legal questions and gives some facts
on slaughtering (Part II). It then agrees with the Court's conclusion in
Liga van Moskeegn that the relevant secondary law and its application in a
1. See e.g. Johannes Caspar & J6rg Luy, eds, Tierschutz bei der religib'sen
Schlachtung /Animal Welfare at Religious Slaughter (Baden Baden: Nomos,
2010); Olivier Le Bot sees a trend towards a stronger protection of
religious slaughter or sacrifice practices, to the detriment of animals:
Olivier Le Bot, "The Limitation of Animal Protection for Religious or
Cultural Reasons" (2016) 13:1 US - China Law Review 1 at 3-6; Stefan
Kirchner & Nafisa Yeasmin, "Ein Recht auf Schichten? Tierschutz und
Religionsfreiheit in der EMRK aus nordeuropiischer Sicht" (2018) 24:1
Kirche und Recht 114. On conflicts and synergies, see: Tom Sparks,
"Protection of Animals Through Human Rights: The Case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights" in Anne Peters, ed, GlobalAnimal
Law (Heidelberg: Springer, 2019).
2. Liga van Moskee~n en islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZWv
Vlaams Gewest (29 May 2018), C-436/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:335 (CJEU)
[Liga van Moskee~].
3. EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December
2000 [2007] OJ, C 303/01 [EUCFR].
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concrete context is in conformity with the animal welfare mainstreaming
clause (Part III). This article will then discuss and confirm the regulation's
compatibility with the fundamental right to the free exercise of religion
(Part IV). It additionally enquires (which the Court did not) whether
Liga van MoskeeMn involves indirect discrimination against Muslims (Part
V). The article finds that neither the existence of these European Union-
law provisions nor their application in a concrete situation violates
fundamental rights of members of the Muslim community. Ultimately, I
do not disagree with the outcome of the case but criticize the Court (and
to a lesser extent the Advocate General's opinion) for failing to consider
the rights of religious minorities more broadly, and for not addressing the
animal welfare point sufficiently. We need to remain wary both of vilifying
socially disadvantaged groups of humans (such as Muslim residents
in Northern European countries) and of brutalising animals, because,
speaking with Theodor Adorno, both harms might in psychological and
ethical terms be related and even intertwined (Part VI). 4
II. Background, proceedings, and facts on slaughter
The Dutch speaking Court of First Instance of Brussels had requested
a preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the TFEU. The request was
triggered by a change in practice of the Flemish authorities on the issuance
of permits for ritual slaughtering. Since 1998, the competent authorities
had allowed slaughter in temporary slaughterhouses during the peak time
of the Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha, or the Feast of Sacrifice. Following
a Belgian constitutional reform, competences in matters of animal
welfare were transferred to the regions in 2014. The new government
of the Flemish region, elected in 2014, appointed a minister for animal
protection (member of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Allantie). The new Flemish
regional minister announced that he would stop issuing approvals for
temporary slaughterhouses in 2015, relying on the strict requirement of
Article 4(4) of Regulation No 1099/2009, in conjunction with Article
4. Theodor W Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschddigten
Leben, 7d vol 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003) (original 1951),
Aphorismus 68 (translation by the author).
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2(k) of that same regulation.5 The Flemish minister argued that the
temporary slaughterhouses did not satisfy the hygienic requirements of
EU law (laid down in Regulation No 853/2004) when referring to a
2015 report issued by the EU Commission's Directorate General Health
and Food Safety ("DG SANTE Report").6 That report was critical of
groupings of 'home slaughtering' at public sites outside slaughterhouses.
7
However, the DG SANTE Report did not explicitly recommend the
prohibition of such private slaughter.
The applicants in the original proceedings are a group of Muslim
organisations in the Flemish region. They argued that Article 4(4) of
Regulation No 1099/2009, in conjunction with Article 2(k), infringed
their freedom of religion.' Article 4 of Regulation No 1099/2009,
entitling 'stunning methods', provides:
1. Animals shall only be killed after stunning in accordance with the methods
and specific requirements related to the application of those methods set out
in Annex I. The loss of consciousness and sensibility shall be maintained until
the death of the animal ...
4. In the case of animals subject to particular methods of slaughter prescribed
by religious rites, the requirements of paragraph 1 shall not apply provided that
the slaughter takes place in a slaughterhouse.9
Article 2(k) of the same regulation says: "'[s]laughterhouse' means any
establishment used for slaughtering terrestrial animals which falls within
5. EC, Council Regulation (EC) 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the
protection of animals at the time of killing, [2009] OJ, L 303/1, art 4(4)
[Regulation No 1099/2009].
6. EC, Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of
animalorigin, [2006] OJ, L 226/22.
7. EC, Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTA), Final
report of an audit carried out in Belgium from 24 November 2014 to 03
December 2014 in order to evaluate the animal welfare controls in place at
slaughter and during related operations (audit) at para 44, online (pdf): EC
<ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act-getPDF.cfm?PDFID- 11804> [DG SANTE
Report].
8. Regulation No 1099/2009, supra note 5.
9. Ibid [emphasis added].
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the scope of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004".l" The referring court had
doubts as to the validity of the two provisions read together.
Although the case is superficially about places of slaughter, the real
issue is the method of slaughter. The Halal slaughter during the Feast
of Sacrifice (outside of approved slaughterhouses) occurs by cutting and
bleeding without prior stunning. The welfare implications of un-stunned
slaughter have been examined by the Scientific Panel on Animal Health
and Welfare of the European Food Safety Agency resulting in a 240-
page scientific report and a scientific opinion on welfare aspects of animal
stunning and killing methods, as requested by the EU Commission.11
The Panel took care to circumscribe its mandate by emphasising that it
"did not consider ethical, socio-economic, cultural or religious aspects of
this topic". 12 It reached the conclusion that "if not stunned, [the animals']
welfare will be poor because of pain, fear and other adverse effects".
13 The
explanation is the following:
Most animals which are slaughtered in the EU for human consumption are
killed by cutting major blood vessels in the neck or thorax so that rapid blood
loss occurs. If not stunned, the animal becomes unconscious only after a certain
degree of blood loss has occurred whilst after greater blood loss, death will ensue.
The animals which are slaughtered have systems for detecting and feeling pain
and, as a result of the cut and the blood loss, if not stunned, their welfare will
be poor because of pain, fear and other adverse effects. The cuts which are
used in order that rapid bleeding occurs involve substantial tissue damage in
areas well supplied with pain receptors. 7he rapid decrease in blood pressure which
follows the blood loss is readily detected by the conscious animal and elicits fear and
panic. Poor welfare also results when conscious animals inhale blood because
of bleeding into the trachea. Without stunning, the time between cutting
through the major blood vessels and insensibility, as deduced from behavioural
and brain response, is up to 20 seconds in sheep, up to 25 seconds in pigs, up
to 2 minutes in cattle, up to 2 1/2 or more minutes in poultry, and sometimes
10. Ibid, art 2(k).
11. EFSA Scientific Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, "Opinion of the
Scientific Panel on Animal Health and Welfare on a Request from the
Commission Related to Welfare Aspects of the Main Systems of Stunning
and Killing the Main Commercial Species of Animals" (2004) 45 EFSA
Journal 1.
12. Ibidat 1.
13. Ibid at 5.
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15 minutes or more in fish.
14
The Panel asserted: "Due to the serious animal welfare concerns associated
with slaughter without stunning, pre-cut stunning should always be
performed".15
Along the same lines, the professional association of the Federation
of Veterinarians of Europe, pronounced:
the opinion that from an animal welfare point of view, and out of respect for
an animal as a sentient being, the practice of slaughtering animals without
prior stunning is unacceptable under any circumstances, for the following
reasons: Slaughter without stunning increases the time to loss of consciousness,
sometimes up to several minutes. During this period of consciousness the
animal can be exposed to unnecessary pain and suffering due to: exposed
wound surfaces; the possible aspiration of blood and, in the case of ruminants,
rumen content; the possible suffering from asphyxia after severing the n.
phrenicus and n. vagus. Slaughter without prior stunning requires in most cases
additional restraint, which may cause additional stress to an animal that is
almost certainly already frightened. 6
In conclusion, from a purely veterinarian standpoint, slaughter without
stunning should be avoided. The relevant EU regulation nevertheless
allows it under limited circumstances. The question in the Liga van
Moskeetn case is whether the exception goes far enough.
III. Compatibility of the EU regulation with Article
13 TFEU
One benchmark for the regulation's provisions is Article 13 TFEU, the
14. Ibid [emphasis added].
15. Ibid at 2.
16. Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (FVE), "Slaughter of Animals
Without Prior Stunning: FVE Position" (2005) Paper FVE/02/104 at 1,
online (pdf): FVE <www.fve.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/fve 02 104
slaughter-prior stunning.pdf> [the opinion of the FVE] [emphasis
added].
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EU animal mainstreaming clause.17 It did not play a big role for the case
but shall be mentioned for the sake of completeness.I" Article 13 TFEU
provides:
In formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, fisheries, transport,
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the
Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full
regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative
or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in
particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage."
This mainstreaming clause addresses both the EU and Member States,
but it does not relate to all EU policies (notably not to trade policy). The
interesting questions are what 'paying full regard' exactly means, and also
what 'animal welfare' is. But these questions were not at issue in Liga van
MoskeeMn. The proceedings were only about the second part of the clause,
the exception ('while respecting'). The referring court opined that the EU
Regulation No 1099/2009 did not sufficiently accommodate the relevant
Belgian laws. However, it was not clear which laws in Belgium "relating
in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage
20
were concerned by the application of the controversial Regulation No
1099/2009.21 Therefore, the CJEU did not find any disrespect of Belgian
laws on religious slaughter, and hence no incompatibility with the savings
clause of Article 13 TFEU. 22 This seems fully correct.
IV. Compatibility of the EU regulation with the
freedom of religion
The centrepiece of the judgment is the examination of the validity of
17. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
of 13 December 2007 (version of the 'Treaty of Lisbon'), art 13 (OJ 2008
C 115/47) [TFEU].
18. Liga van Moskeein, supra note 2 at paras 81-83.
19. TFEU, supra note 17, art 13.
20. Ibid.
21. Liga van Moskeen, supra note 2 at para 81.
22. Ibidat para 83.
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Regulation No 1099/2009 in light of Article 10 of the EUCFR.23 The
regulation interferes with freedom of religion by relegating ritual slaughter
to approved slaughterhouses. Such a requirement constitutes interference
because ritual slaughter is a manifestation of religion (forum externum).
Notably, during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice, one of the holiest holidays
of the Muslim Religion, the slaughter is an important component of the
feast (however, it may not be compulsory). This means that a law which
regulates the place for performing religious slaughter falls within the
scope of Article 10(1) EUCFR.
24
The next question is whether the regulation actually restricts the
freedom of religion. At this point we need to distinguish between the
mere existence of the rule as such (section A), and its application to the
concrete case during the Feast of Sacrifice (section B).
A. No actual restriction of the fundamental right by the
rule "as such"
The Court said that the rule "does not in itsef give rise to any restriction
on the right to freedom of religion of practicing Muslims", 25 because
religious slaughter is not prohibited. On the contrary, the regulation
contains an express derogation from the requirement of stunning,
specifically for the purposes of ensuring respect for the freedom of
religion and the right to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching,
practice, and observance.
26
The obligation to use an approved slaughterhouse facially appears
'perfectly neutral'. As the Advocate General Nils Wahl stressed, it applies
to any party irrespective of any connection with a particular religion.27
It "concerns in a non-discriminatory manner all producers of meat in
23. Ibid at paras 38-80; see Part V.C. for discussion on Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR").
24. Ibid at para 45.
25. Ibid at para 68 [emphasis added].
26. Ibid at para 57.
27. Liga van Moskee~n en islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZWv
Vlaams Gewest (30 November 2017), C-426/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:926,
Opinion of AG Wahl at para 78 [Opinion of AG Wahl].
278 Peters, Religious Slaughter and Animal Welfare Revisited
Europe", says the Court.28 In sum, both Advocate General Wahl and the
Court denied that the legislation at issue constituted any restriction of
the freedom of religion.29
This reasoning should be questioned. It could be argued that the
regulation does indeed limit (or restrict) the freedom of religious practice
of Muslims, as it in fact hinders the practice of religious slaughter. This
was the view of the referring court."0 The CJEU answered that it is a
mere question of capacity. The approved slaughterhouses in the Flemish
region do not have sufficient slaughter capacity during the four days of
the Feast of Sacrifice. Additional slaughterhouses would require huge
financial investments, and would not be viable, especially because they
would be needed for only a few days per year. The validity of an EU law
cannot depend on what the court called "retrospective assessments of
its efficacy".1l The capacity problem arises only in a limited number of
municipalities in the Flemish region, and is not inherently related to the
application of the regulation throughout the EU. However, the validity
of a regulation must be examined taking into account the situation in the
entire EU.3 2 The CJEU concluded that the EU regulation, as such, "does
not in itself create any restriction" of the freedom of religion.3
Indeed, Regulation No 1099/2009 specifically accommodates
religious slaughter (in Article 4(4) cited above) but leaves a leeway to the
Member States. The regulation's preamble puts it as follows:
Since Community provisions applicable to religious slaughter have been
transposed differently depending on national contexts and considering that
national rules take into account dimensions that go beyond the purpose of this
Regulation, it is important that derogation from stunning animals prior to
slaughter should be maintained, leaving, however, a certain level of subsidiarity
to each Member State. As a consequence, this Regulation respects the
28. Liga van Moskeein, supra note 2 at para 61.
29. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at para 89. Advocate General Wahl
did not stop here but entered into a further discussion in case the Court
should find that there had been a restriction of the fundamental right (at
para 90 et seq).
30. Liga van Moskee~, supra note 2 at para 69.
31. Jbidat para 71.
32. Jbidat paras 73-74.
33. Jbidat para 79.
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freedom of religion and the right to manifest religion or belief in worship,
teaching, practice and observance, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
4
Dimensions 'beyond the purpose' of the regulation seem to be, on the
one hand, the accommodation of religious freedom and, on the other
hand, heightened animal welfare sensibilities in some Member States.
The Regulation 1099/2009 therefore allows Member States to
completely ban un-stunned slaughter. This is currently the state of the
law, for example, in Slovenia and Denmark. In contrast, Germany follows
the line of the regulation and allows short term electroshocks that run
only through the head of the animal "if this is necessary to cater for the
needs of members of specific religious communities where compelling
rules of their religious community prohibit the use of other methods of
stunning".5 The explanation of this provision is that Muslim slaughter
prescriptions allow stunning before bleeding the animal, provided that
the animal is sure to be still alive when bleeding out, and therefore prefers
this 'weaker' stunning method.6 The member States' different modalities
of implementing the regulation confirm the Court's finding that the
mere existence of the regulation, with its explicit accommodation for
religious demands and the leeway it gives to EU Member States on this
point, does not in itself restrict the freedom of religion. 7 The Court's
findings are sound.
B. Strict application of the provisions during the Feast
of Sacrifice in Muslim populated areas
A different question is whether the application of the regulation in a
34. Regulation No 1099/2009, supra note 5 at preamble, para 18 [emphasis
added].
35. Verordnung zum Schutz von Tieren im Zusammenhang mit der
Schlachtung oder T6tung und zur Durchfiihrung der Verordnung of 20
December 2012 at §13(3) (BGBI 1 2012 S 2982) at §13(1)(3) [translation
by the author].
36. See Part V.D.
37. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 (Advocate General Wahl even found
it "paradoxical" to call into question the validity of the provisions from the
perspective of religious freedom at para 70).
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concrete situation - during the Feast of Sacrifice - constitutes a
restriction, and possibly a violation, of the freedom of religion. This is
a serious question, but it was not asked by the referring court. The First
Instance Court of Brussels had only posed the question of validity of
the regulation. Under Article 267 TFEU, the Court could have asked a
different question, namely how the regulation must be interpreted. Only
the question of interpretation, the second variant of the referral for a
preliminary ruling, could have opened the way for examining the effects
of applying the regulation in a specific context.
However, in this affair, the Advocate General Wahl had advised
the Court not to give an answer on the interpretation of the relevant
regulations because judicial interpretative guidelines could - in his
opinion - ultimately undermine the precise rules and thus overstep the
competence of the Court.3"
I doubt this, because the CJEU is, as a matter of principle, allowed
and even required "to reformulate the questions referred to it and, in
that context, to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts
require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those
provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the
Court by those courts".39
So the Court could have, without acting ultra vires, asked an
interesting question: does the strict and across-the-board application of the
prohibition of home slaughter (also during these four days and in Muslim-
populated areas) constitute an interference with and a defacto restriction
of a religious practice? Must we therefore read into this regulation an
unwritten exception leading to non-application during the Feast of
Sacrifice for reasons of freedom of religion and non-discrimination? These
questions can be discussed under the heading of freedom of religion as a
liberty, but it is rather the aspect of discrimination on religious grounds
which stands out. In any case, the relevant considerations are similar
(both for freedom of religion tout court and for non-discrimination on
38. Ibid at para 140.
39. Isabel Gonzdlez Castro v Mutua Umivale, ProsegurEspana SL, Instituto
Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) (19 September 2018), C-41/17,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:736 (CJEU) at para 54.
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the basis of religion). This Article therefore shifts the focus on the latter
fundamental right - which was not discussed by the CJEU.
V. Indirect discrimination of a religious group
through strict application of the regulation?
The case raises the spectre of a defacto, indirect discrimination of Muslims
through the disproportionate impact on this specific group brought
about by the application of Regulation 1099/2009. The benchmarks
are the fundamental right not to be discriminated against (Article 21(1)
EUCFR) and the anti-discrimination mainstreaming clause of Article
10 TFEU, which forms a guideline for the making, interpretation, and
application of secondary legislation.4"
How does discrimination come into play? The freedom of religion
does not grant believers a positive legal entitlement to obtain a permission
to perform slaughter without stunning.41 But if a state decides to allow
slaughter without stunning it must avoid the discrimination of members
of particular groups in this context, for example, Muslim groups in
comparison to Jewish communities.
A. The test for indirect discrimination
The requirement of slaughter in official, authorised slaughterhouses does
not target any religious group. This requisite is facially neutral in its
wording. However, it might deploy a disproportionate negative impact
40. EUCFR, supra note 3 ("Any discrimination based on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation
shall be prohibited", art 21(1)); TFEU, supra note 17 ("In defining and
implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation", art 10).
41. Kirchner & Yeasmin, supra note 1 at 121.
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on Muslims, because this is the only group which needs or wants to
slaughter during a feast and for whom this activity forms part of their
belief. Only this group has the increased demand during four days of the
year.
An inattention to specific demands of the Muslim community
could in extremis even constitute a so-called passive discrimination
which occurs by omission or neglect of the State (as opposed to active
measures).42 Sometimes, structurally disadvantaged groups need positive
state measures, especially financial support, in order to defacto enjoy a
fundamental right on an equal footing with groups which are socially
better placed, for example, subsidies for minority schools. But in our
case it would go too far to postulate an affirmative duty to provide for
additional slaughter facilities so as to avoid the 'passive' discrimination
of Muslims.4"
However we conceptualise the issue (as potentially indirect
discrimination through inflexible and strict application, or as
potentially passive discrimination through lack of extra funding), such
a verdict cannot be easily pronounced. On the contrary, the standard of
justification for apparently neutral rules or practices, which put members
42. Anne Peters & Doris K6nig, "Das Diskriminierungsverbot" [comparative
commentary on article 14 ECHR/article 3 para. 2 and 3 German
Constitution] in Oliver D6rr, Rainer Grote & Thilo Marauhn, eds,
Konkordanzkommentar EMRK/GG, 2d vol 2 (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2013) at 1335-37.
43. See Association Les Temoins ie Jehovah c France (30 June 2011) No
8916/05, ECLI:CE:ECHR:201 :0630JUD000891605 (ECtHR) at para
52 (a Strasbourg judgment involving tax measures against the French
association of Jehovah's witnesses, in which the ECtHR stated that the
freedom of religion does not require that churches or their members must
be accorded a special fiscal status); Advocate General Wahl in Liga van
Moskee~n read this judgment as saying that freedom of religion does not
entail any obligation to financial support, see: Opinion of AG Wahl, supra
note 27 at para 80.
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of protected groups at a disadvantage, is fairly lenient.44 According
to EU law,45 and the case law of both the CJEU46 and the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"),4 7 the disparate negative impact
of a uniform state policy on members of a particular religious group,
or on persons of a particular ethnic origin, does not constitute indirect
discrimination if the policy is "objectively justified by a legitimate aim,
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary", to
quote the wording of the EU Racial Equality Directive.4" The test under
44. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of
Europe, Handbook on European Non-Discrimination Law (Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union, 2018) at 53-59, online
(pdf): EU FRA <fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra uploads/fra-2018-
handbook-non-discrimination-law-2018 en.pdf>.
45. EC, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of29 June 2000 implementing the
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic
origin [2000] OJ, L 180/22, art 2(2)(b) [Council Directive]. The case law
rarely relies on the EUCFR but rather on the more specific provisions
of EU secondary law. The key provision is Article 2 (2)(b) implementing
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial
or ethnic origin. It defines indirect discrimination on the basis of racial
or ethnic origin (but not on the basis of religion) as follows: "indirect
discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral
provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic
origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless
that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate
aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary"
(art 2(2) (b)).
46. See CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot
diskriminatsia (16 July 2015) C-83/14 (CJEU) (special placement of
electricity meters in Roma-populated district so that the metres cannot be
manipulated or damaged) [CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD].
47. See DHv 7he Czech Republic (13 November 2007) No 57325/00
(ECtHR) at paras 196-201 on the negative effects of the application of
one and the same psychological test for schooling on Roma children. The
tests were conceived for the majority population and did not take Roma
specifics into consideration. The use of the test led to 80 to 90 percent of
those children being sent to special schools.
48. Council Directive, supra note 45, art 2(2)(b).
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the EUCFR is similar.49 In the words of the ECtHR, "a failure to treat
differently persons in relevantly different situations ... is discriminatory if
it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does
not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised".50
If we apply these principles to the case, we see that the non-attention
to specific Muslim demands during those four days "works to the
disadvantage of far more persons possessing the protected characteristic
than persons not possessing it".51 This is because it disadvantages those
who wish to slaughter, and these are exclusively Muslims.
However, this disadvantage would only then violate the prohibition
of (indirect) discrimination of Muslim believers if the state's across-the-
board prohibition of 'free' slaughter would not satisfy the three-pronged
test as established by the Strasbourg case law, namely, a sufficient legal
basis, a legitimate aim, and proportionality.
The strictness of the proportionality test is heavily determined by the
group that is placed at a disadvantage. In our case, it is not a specific racial
or ethnic group but rather a religious group (although the characteristics
overlap). Clearly, any potential direct or indirect discrimination on the
basis of ethnic or racial origin must be strictly scrutinised. The CJEU
stated in a case concerning Roma in Bulgaria: "where there is a difference
in treatment on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, the concept of
49. EUCFR, supra note 3, art 52(1) contains the general principle for
limitations/restrictions of fundamental rights (including the right not to
be discriminated against: "[a] n y limitation on the exercise of the rights
and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle
of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others".
50. See Eweida v United Kingdom (15 January 2013), Nos 48420/10,
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 (ECtHR) at para 88 on rules on
employee clothing in state-held enterprise (British Airways) and the
enterprise's failure to take into account special needs of religious groups.
51. CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD, supra note 46 at para 101.
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objective justification must be interpreted strictly".52 Inversely, distinctions
(or lacking distinctions) on the basis of religion are normally scrutinised
more leniently, granting the state a broad margin of appreciation.53
Applying the three-pronged test shows that its first condition is met:
the obligation to use authorised slaughterhouses has its formal basis in
the EU regulations. The second prong is the legitimate aim. Here we
need to distinguish two objectives of the regulation: food safety on the
one hand and animal welfare on the other hand.
With regard to the first objective (food safety for public health), the
Advocate General found the obligation to use approved slaughterhouses
not to be necessary and proportionate.54 Some of the rules, for example,
on the refrigerated storage of the meat, are superfluous for meat that will
be given directly to the final consumer during the Feast of Sacrifice.55
Temporary slaughter plants with precise sanitary standards could offer
sufficient health guarantees.56 But the Advocate General discussed all this
only arguendo. He had - followed by the Court - already denied any
interference with fundamental rights.5 7 We need not further comment on
the public health considerations. Even if the application of the regulation
were not necessary to protect public health, it could still be necessary to
protect animal welfare and be justified on this ground. We therefore turn
to the regulation's second objective, the protection of animal welfare, in
more detail.
52. Ibid at para 112.
53. See Palau-Martinez v France (16 December 2003) No 64927/01 (ECtHR)
at paras 39, 41; Ismailova v Russia (29 November 2007) No 37614/02
(ECtHR) at para 62; Religionsgemeinschaf der Zeugen Jehovas v Austria
(31 July 2008) No 40825/98 (ECtHR) at para 99; Lff'elmann vAustria
(12 March 2009) No 42967/98 at para 49; Savez Crkava "Rijec ivota "v
Croatia (9 December 2010) No 7798/08 (ECtHR) at paras 85-86.
54. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at paras 129-33; see also paras 97,
100.
55. Ibid at para 127.
56. Ibid at para 132.
57. Ibidat para 89.
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B. [he prohibition of home slaughter as a suitable and
necessary measure to further animal welfare as a
legitimate objective in the public interest
The regulation inter alia seeks to protect animal welfare. This goal has
been recognised by the EU animal welfare mainstreaming clause (Article
13 TFEU) and in the settled case law of the CJEU as "a legitimate
objective in the public interest" to be pursued by EU legislation.5"
The next legal question is whether the regulation's prohibition of
home slaughter is apt to further this legitimate goal. At first sight, a more
pertinent and suitable measure would be a stunning requirement. As
explained above (Part II), animal welfare is better protected in slaughter
with stunning than in un-stunned slaughter.59 Based on these veterinarian
insights, it can quite safely be said that strict prohibitions of un-stunned
slaughter are suitable measures for furthering animal welfare. On these
grounds some EU Member States, for example, Slovenia and Denmark,
do not allow slaughter without prior stunning and thus completely
58. Viamex Agrar Handel and ZVK (C-37/06), Zuchtvieh-Kontor GmbH
(ZVK) (C-58/06) v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (17 January 2008), in
joined cases C-37/06 and C-58/06, EU:C:2008:18 (ECJ) at paras 22-23;
Nationale Raad van Dierenkwekers en Liefhebbers VZWandAndibel VZW
v Belgische Staat (19 June 2008), C-219/07, EU:C:2008:353 (ECJ) at
para 27; Herbert Schaible v Land Baden- Wiirttemnberg (23 April 2013),
C-101/12, EU:C:2013:661 (ECJ) at para 35; Zuchtvieh-Export GmbHv
Stadt Kempten (Landesanwaltschaft Bayern intervening) (23 April 2015),
C-424/13, EU:C:2015:259 (ECJ) at para 35.
59. See in this sense also Opinion ofAG Wahl, supra note 27 (reporting that
the pleadings in the proceeding made it "difficult to challenge ... that the
slaughtering of an animal that has not been stunned is undeniably likely
to cause the animal greater pain and suffering" at para 102).
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prohibit some forms of religious slaughter. 60
Next, we need to enquire whether the prohibition or strict regulation
of religious slaughter is unnecessary for securing animal welfare, because
non-religious industrial slaughter with conventional stunning methods
(such as electroshock through the heart of the animal or gassing) has
deficits, by design and due to poor implementation, and causes enormous
welfare problems.61 This argument was formulated by the General
Advocate in Liga van Moskeetn as follows:
There is nothing to rule out the possibility that slaughtering without stunning,
carried out in proper circumstances, will be less painful for the animal than
slaughtering the animal after stunning it in circumstances in which, for
obvious reasons of profitability, and given the widespread industrialisation of
the production of food of animal origin, the stress and suffering experienced by
the animal when it is killed are exacerbated.62
Indeed, cruel lengthy transports to slaughter plants, extreme time
pressure during slaughter, faulty equipment, and untrained personnel
cause immense suffering. In European slaughterhouses, frequent mishaps
in the shooting of cattle is reported, and the asphyxiation of pigs and
60. In a recent judgment, the Slovenian Constitutional Court upheld this
prohibition as being in conformity with freedom of religion (judgment
(U-I-140/14) of 25 April 2018). See also Robert J Delahunty, "Does
Animal Welfare Trump Religious Liberty? The Danish ban on Kosher and
Halal" (2015) 16:2 San Diego International Law Journal 341; see also
Christos Kypraios & Pallavi Arora, "Ritual Slaughter in Europe: Towards
Reconciling Animal Welfare and religious Pluralism" (2018) 45:2 U
Observateur des Nations Unies: Revue de l'Association francaise pour les
Nations Unies 44.
61. See also EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW),
"Guidance on the Assessment Criteria for Applications for New or
Modified Stunning Methods Regarding Animal Protection at the Time
of Killing" (2018) EFSA Journal 16:7 (which prescribes how to perform
and document new or modified stunning methods that are not among the
methods 'approved' by the EU Slaughter Regulation No 1099/2009).
62. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at para 107 [footnotes omitted].
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the electrocution of poultry are not quick and painless either.63 These
problems, however, cannot exonerate the practice of slaughter without
stunning.
It remains the case that un-stunned slaughter is not equally suited
to reach the objective of relative animal welfare. From the perspective of
animal welfare, we need to compare the suffering caused by conventional
stunning/killing and religious un-stunned slaughter in real conditions.
Although the sheer number of killing in observation of religious rules is
probably lower than the quantity of 'worldly' killing, it is not the case that
religious slaughter is less industrialized and therefore inevitably performed
with more care than other slaughter. Unfortunately, the problems owed
to the logics of industrialisation, automatization, and pressure to lower
the costs affect both 'worldly' slaughter and religious slaughter.64
It would therefore not be correct to compare apples with pears, and
point to idealised religious practices in order to criticise the non-religious
slaughter practices as they happen in the real world. The two types of
slaughter practices (stunned and un-stunned) are not identical in their
effect on animal welfare. Veterinarians agree that stunning is better for
63. The frequent scandals have led some countries to prescribe video
recording in slaughterhouses, other states encourage voluntary video
documentation. See for a comparative overview: Wissenschaftliche
Dienste des Bundestages, "Videoaufzeichnungen in Schlachth6fen"
(Academic Services of the German Parliament, expert opinion WD 5 -
3000 - 042/18) (27 March 2018).
64. See for welfare problems of current practices in the context of Islamic
slaughter: Halal Slaughter Watch, Compatibility between the OIE standards
and the requirements of Islamic Law with special reference to the prevention of
cruelty to animals during transport and slaughter, at 5, online (pdf): <www.
halal-slaughter-watch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11 OIE-PaperA
Religious-slaughter.pdf>. AI-Hafiz Basheer Ahmad Masri identifies the
"real problem" as "the general members of the Muslim public who buy
their meat from the shops in their countries never get a chance to see
for themselves the un-Islamic and inhumane scenes within some of their
slaughter houses. If they knew what was happening there, they would
stop eating meat or, at least, start lobbying the powers that be to have the
Islamic rules implemented" in Animals in Islam (Petersfield: Athene Trust,
1989) at 57.
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the animals.65
Short of a total ban against un-stunned slaughter, the strict requirement
of slaughtering only in approved facilities helps to protect animal welfare
(relatively speaking). Un-stunned slaughter that is done unprofessionally
causes more pain and suffering than professionally performed killing.66
If proper shackling facilities, trained personnel, and good equipment are
lacking, animals will suffer more pain and anxiety.6 7 It is therefore very
important to continue the ongoing attempts to improve animal welfare
in religious slaughter by developing best practices. Recommendations
for best practices include post-cut stunning, reversible stunning, and
better restraining methods.6" The EU's prohibition of home slaughter
helps to ensure a certain degree of professionalism and works towards
establishing these best practices. It is therefore apt to further animal
welfare. Concomitantly, a policy to minimise and professionalise un-
stunned killing cannot be qualified as unnecessary.
C. Relevant case law of the ECtHR
In order to determine whether the refusal to relax the prohibition of
home slaughter during the four days of the Feast of Sacrifice is not
only a suitable and necessary but moreover a proportionate measure for
protecting animal welfare at the expense of burdening Muslim believers,
we should distinguish relevant prior case law. This comprises the case
law of the ECtHR on the ECHR. In Liga van Moskeegn, the CJEU
65. See the opinion of the FVE, supra note 16.
66. Cf. on aspects of professionality in un-stunned slaughter: DG SANTE
Report, supra note 7 at para 39 (finding that the training of the staff in
Belgian slaughterhouses did not adequately cover the differences between
slaughter with stunning and without stunning. The report concluded
that "[t]he system of certificates of competence assures a good level of
competence among operators, although the training and examination
lacks elements on the important differences where slaughter without
stunning is relevant" at 18).
67. See the opinion of the FVE, supra note 16.
68. See Antonio Velarde et al, "Improving Animal Welfare during Religious
Slaughter", Dialrel Reports (Cardiff: Cardiff University School of City and
Regional Planning, 2010).
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completely left aside freedom of religion as codified in Article 9 ECHR,
because the Convention is not binding on the EU as long as the EU has
not acceded it.69 However, Article 52(3) of the EUCFR prescribes that
the Charter ights' "meaning and scope ... shall be the same as those laid
down by the said Convention", and the Charter's preamble reaffirms "the
rights as they result, in particular, from ... the case-law ... of the European
Court of Human Rights".7' Following these prescriptions, the CJEU has
frequently relied on the case-law of the ECtHR.
In a recent affair before the ECtHR, the Court had qualified the
Turkish state's refusal to formally recognize the Alevi community as a
religious denomination to be an unlawful discrimination of that group
(in violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 of the ECHR).
7 1
The lack of recognition of the Alevi community was a targeted and an
incisive state policy. In contrast, the incidental effect of the prohibition of
slaughter in irregular slaughterhouses, within the framework of explicit
and specific legal exemptions for religious Halal slaughter, is much less
serious for the Muslim community in Belgium.
Another case to distinguish is Cha'are Shalom.72 That judgment was
about everyday religious slaughter following particularly strict rituals by a
group of ultraorthodox Jews in France. The group had not been admitted
to slaughterhouses, because the state did not consider the group to be
sufficiently representative. The ECtHR had also (similarly to the CJEU in
Liga van Moskee~n) denied any interference with Article 10 ECHR (alone
and in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR), with the argument that
there "would be interference with the freedom to manifest one's religion
only ifthe illegality of performing ritual slaughter made it impossible for
[the religious group] to eat meat from animals slaughtered in accordance
with the religious prescriptions they considered applicable"73 which is
69. Liga van Moskee~n, supra note 2 at para 40.
70. EUCFR, supra note 3, art 52(3).
71. Izzettin Dogan v Turkey, (26 April 2016) No 62649/10 (ECtHR) at paras
155-85.
72. Cha're Shalom Ve Tsedek v France, (27 June 2000) No 27417/95
(ECtHR) [Cha'are Shalom].
73. Ibid at para 80 [emphasis added].
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not the case if such meat can be imported.74 The alternative, namely, the
importation of meat, is readily available because goods can freely circulate
in the EU. So the open market helps to safeguard the fundamental right.
As a side-note, it is doubtful whether reliance on meat importation is
a more animal-welfare alternative. Rather, it simply outsources animal
cruelty.
Can the reasoning of Cha'are Shalom then be transferred to the case at
hand, namely, that barriers to slaughtering are acceptable as long as meat
can be procured from elsewhere? Such transfer seems impossible, because
Liga van MoskeeMn is not about eating the meat but about performing the
act of slaughter, specifically as a component of the high religious feast.
75
This feature of the case makes it impossible to dismiss the religious claim
simply by pointing out that the believers can buy the meat elsewhere.
Another dictum of Cha'are Shalom might be applicable to our case.
The ECtHR had taken "the view that the right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention cannot extend to the right to
take part in person in the performance of ritualslaughter and the subsequent
certification process ... ".76 Admittedly, the Court made this statement
with regard to completely different context in which the ritual of festive
slaughter was not at issue. The issue in Cha'are Shalom was rather the
need for the ultraorthodox group to rely on slaughter performed by other
licensed slaughterers for them according to their rites, without being able
to examine in person whether their stricter rites had been duly observed.
So the Court's remark may not too easily be read as a plain statement
that the freedom of religion does not comprise the right to slaughter
with one's own hands. Nevertheless, it does show the proper direction,
namely, that not every behaviour of an overall religious activity (such as
celebrating the Feast of Sacrifice) is covered by the fundamental right.
D. Proportionality of the refusal to make an exception
The key question is whether the defacto obstacle for the exercise of the
74. Ibidat paras 80-81.
75. Liga van Moskee~, supra note 2 at para 45.
76. Ch'are Shalom, supra note 72 at para 82 [emphasis added].
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religious rite created by the refusal to grant a temporary permission for
home slaughter and the resulting failure to accommodate the unusually
high demand for religious slaughter during the days of the Muslim Feast
of Sacrifice is proportionate.
77
Advocate General Wahl had opined - arguendo - that (should the
Court find a limitation of the fundamental right) the requirement of using
only approved slaughterhouses would not be proportionate to reach the
objective of animal welfare, and would therefore have to be qualified as an
unjustified limitation and thus as a violation of the freedom of religion.
7
The Advocate General thought that the use of temporary plants might
even be better for animals, because they create less stress (although he did
not make it clear why this should be the case).79 Overall, the Advocate
General was "of the opinion that the obligation for slaughtering to be
carried out in an approved slaughterhouse may go beyond what is strictly
necessary in order to attain the objective of protecting animal welfare
pursued when it is a case of slaughtering an animal in the performance of
a religious rite at a very precise time of the year"."
I respectfully disagree and submit that the strict requirement of
slaughtering only in approved plants does not unduly curtail the free
exercise of religion. Religious opinion diverges whether slaughter is
compulsory during the Feast of Sacrifice or not."l Concomitantly, there
seems to be a trend, particularly among younger practising Muslims, to
consider that the slaughtering of an animal during the Feast of Sacrifice
may be substituted by a monetary donation.2 It is of course not the
province of courts to determine this religious controversy. But courts may
take into account that inside a religious community, various views exist
77. Cf. EUCFR, supra note 3, art 52(1) (see the wording of the provision,
supra note 49).
78. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at paras 98-128; see also paras 91,
97, and 133.
79. Ibid at para 119.
80. Ibid at para 124.
81. Cf Liga van Moskee~, supra note 2 at para 50.
82. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at para 54 (this point was intensely
discussed in the hearings).
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on this point, and factor this into their balancing decision.
Numerous Islamic authorities have pronounced themselves in
favour of pre-slaughter reversible stunning. According to a 1986
recommendation by the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam-al-
Islam) jointly with WHO, "[p]re-slaughter stunning by electric shock,
if proven to lessen the animal's suffering, is lawful, provided that it is
carried out with the weakest current that directly renders the animal
unconscious, and that it neither leads to the animal's death nor renders
its meat harmful to consumers".3 The pioneering and most authoritative
Muslim writer on animal welfare in the context of the Islamic tradition
and expert on slaughter techniques, AI-Hafiz Basheer Ahmad Masri,
established that "the main counsel of Islam in the slaughter of food
animals is to do it in the least painful manner, and numerous Qur'anic
and Ahadith injunctions have been cited to that effect".8 4 According to
Masri, pre-slaughter stunning which does not kill the animal is perfectly
compatible with the Islamic method of slaughter as it does not affect the
flow of the blood. Masri opines that had pre-slaughter stunning been
invented during the time of the Holy Prophet Muhammad, he would
83. WHO, Joint meeting of the League of Muslim World (LMW) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) on Islamic rules governing foods of animal
origin (held on 5-7 December 1985), WHO Doc WHO-EM/FOS/1-E
(January 1986) at 8, online (pdf): WHO <apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
handle/10665/116451/who em fos 1 een.pdf>. See the list of the
24 Muslim members of that committee in Masri, supra note 64, at 199.
This recommendation had been preceded by a 1960 Fatwa (unanimous
verdict) adopted by a committee of jurists of the AI-Azhar University in
Cairo which held: "Muslim countries, by approving the modern method
of slaughtering [i.e. with pre-slaughter stunning that is not lethal], have
no religious objection in their way" (at 191). Masri cites further Islamic
authors in favour of pre-slaughter stunning (at 191-92). See also Richard
C Foltz, Animals in Islamic Tradition andMuslim Cultures (Oxford: One
World, 2006) at 105-27. See for a critique of modern, ostensibly 'Halal'
slaughter from the perspective of Islam scholars Lisa Kemmerer, Animals
in the World Religions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 241,
259-60.
84. Masri, supra note 64 at 188.
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have prescribed stunning.8 5 Indeed, slaughter practices minimising
suffering would seem to be encouraged by a modern reading of the Koran
which shows that the holy text does not consider animals as inferior to
humans and oes not confer humans any authority over them.6
Also, the religious rule or custom apparently provides that meat
should be shared with neighbours (which could be understood as
implying that the neighbours themselves do not slaughter). Or, maybe
believers could travel to other parts of Belgium where the slaughter
facilities are not overcrowded.
Another aspect is that the products of slaughter are not fully
consumed only by religious believers. It has been assessed that normally
half of the animal slaughtered in observance of a religious prescription
is sold on the ordinary meat market for consumption by people who do
not care for the religious rule. Arguably, already this fact creates more
animal suffering than necessary.8 7 To conclude, taking these aspects into
account, the burden on the exercise of the freedom of religion created
by the application of the controversial regulation seems not too high in
proportion to the objective of animal welfare.
E. Summary
Overall, the EU regulation seeks to assure proper and professional
slaughter by relegating it to authorised slaughterhouses which offer more
guarantees for using the right equipment and trained personnel than
non-authorised facilities.88 The weak point of the regulation is that the
85. Ibidat 189-90; see also 157-204 generally on slaughter.
86. Sarra Tlili, Animals in the Qur'an (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012) at 82-83, 91, 136-37.
87. See J6rg Luy, "DIALREL Ethics Workshop 1: Ethical Evaluation of Six
Political Options for Religious Slaughter" in Caspar & Luy, supra note 1
at 203-209 (Luy constates a "violation of the principle of proportionality
which is ethically not acceptable" at 209).
88. But see Advocate General Wahl who is "not convinced .. that the use of
approved slaughterhouses is always an effective bulwark against animal
suffering" (Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at para 109). This is
of course correct. However, the requirement goes at least in the right
direction.
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strict monopoly for authorised slaughter plants is not exactly tailored to
the objective of animal welfare. A strict requirement of stunning would
be a much better targeted rule. Such a requirement would, as explained,
not necessarily offend Muslims, but it would trod further into the sphere
of religious doctrine. In order to avoid this, reliance on professionalism,
in different manifestations, seems to be a proper 'proxy' for making a
contribution to improve animal welfare - both in religious and in non-
religious slaughter.
All aspects considered, and based on the rather generous standard
of justification that is pertinent for our case, the regulation and its
application offers a sufficiently reasonable justification for tolerating the
adverse impact on the Muslim population of the region during the four
days of the Feast of Sacrifice. 89 In conclusion, no indirect discrimination
of Muslims in the region is present.
Issues of Halal slaughter will continue to occupy the Court of
Justice of the EU. In a recent proceeding upon question for reference
by the Administrative Court of Appeals of Versailles (France), the Court
decided that the European label 'organic farming' may not be conferred
on products deriving from meat of animals that had been slaughtered
without stunning.90 The tension between freedom of religion and animal
welfare will need constant readjustment.
VI. Conclusion
In Liga van MoskeeMn, Advocate General Nils Wahl duly noted that
in debates about religious slaughter "the spectre of stigmatisation very
swiftly appears. It is historically prevalent and care must be taken not
89. CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD, supra note 46 at para 112.
90. Oeuvre d'assistance aux betes d'abattoirs (OABA) v Ministre de I'agriculture
et de I'alimentation, Premier minister, Bionoor Ecocert France, Institut
national de [origine et de la qualite (INAO) (26 February 2019) C-497/17
ECLI (CJEU). The case concerned "Council Regulation (EC) No
834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labelling of organic
products and Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September
2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing, read in the light
of Article 13 TFEU.
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to encourage it". 91 Indeed, the current political and societal climate in
Europe is conducive to hostility towards Muslims. In this context, we
must pay attention that concern for animal welfare is not played out
against respect for human dignity and against religious and cultural
pluralism.
Such easy but false antagonism can be avoided, because there is no
necessary contradiction between the agendas of humanism and animal
protection. Quite to the contrary, they can even be seen as aligned. The
reason is that the de-humanisation of humans which can foreshadow
discrimination, stigmatisation, and even extermination, finds its model
and training-ground in the debasement of animals. When extreme violence
against animals, as the prototypical 'other', is tolerated, condoned, and
entrenched, it becomes difficult to uphold the cultural ban on violence
against humans, especially against those groups that are likened to
animals. In that sense, Theodor Adorno wrote that "the recurring stance
about savages, blacks, or Japanese [or Muslim immigrants, we might
add] resembling animals already contains the key to the pogrom. The
defiance with which the perpetrator pushes aside this glance - '[i] t is only
an animal' - repeats itself in his cruelty towards humans, in which the
perpetrator constantly has to confirm 'only an animal' - because he
could not fully believe it with regard to the animal either".
92
Some readers might find that un-stunned slaughter constitutes
extreme violence against animals. Could it be seen as a training ground
for violence against humans as practised, for example, by soldiers of the
Islamic State? Or rather, do not all forms of mass slaughter of animals
ultimately constitute extreme violence which makes the consumers
of such meat complacent towards the suffering of weaker members of
society, which in turn could result in indifference towards the fate of
weaker humans or even fuel violence against them?
Awareness of the danger of demeaning and debasing humans, by
condemning 'their' cruelty towards animals can be employed as a positive
force for sharpening our consciousness and improving our consideration
91. Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 27 at para 106.
92. Adorno, supra note 4.
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for the 'other'. Along that line, the way forward seems to be the inter-
cultural and inter-religious dialogue on matters of slaughter - and an
overall reduction or even abandonment of the consumption of animal
meat where healthy and ethical alternatives exist. 9'
93. See e.g. Velarde et al, supra note 68.

